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Realism, Narrative, and Happenstance: Thucydides’ Tale of Brasidas
THOMAS HEILKE University of Kansas
Neorealism and some versions of realism seek to furnish nomothetic theories of the internationalsystem at the same time that they also strive to prescribe policy for political leaders. Insofaras practical advice is insufficiently articulated by means of either nomothesis or the structural
theoretical framework that (neo-)realist paradigms supply, these two aspirations seem contradictory.
This essay is an examination of what contemporary realism and, especially, neorealism require to make
practical wisdom available for practitioners. It argues that narrative, which is exemplified in the so-called
classical realism of Thucydides, remains a crucial component of practical realism and neorealism.
Realism and, particularly, neorealism both holdto a pair of seemingly contradictory aspirations.On the one hand, modern realist and, especially,
neorealist theorists seek to furnish theories of the inter-
national system that establish law-like axioms concern-
ing the nature of that system (Kegley 1995, 27; Waltz
1979, 65–67, 116–17, 127, 186–87, 1995, 71ff.). On the
other hand, both also strive to prescribe policy for polit-
ical leaders. Accordingly, realism and neorealism must
be understood not merely as academic “theories of in-
ternational relations,” but also as attempts to acquire
a kind of “practical wisdom” concerning interstate or
international matters. What is meant by practical wis-
dom is that realists and neorealists (including the most
ardent neorealist defender of realism as a scientific the-
ory, Kenneth Waltz) ultimately are interested in com-
municating their ideas to practitioners of politics and
prescribing to such practitioners the best course(s) of
action.1 The seeming contradiction between these two
aspirations comes to view when we consider that practi-
cal wisdom is insufficiently articulated either by means
of positing law-like generalizations (nomothesis) or
the structural theoretical framework that the realist
paradigm supplies. Appearances notwithstanding, the
search for a nomothetic theory of world politics hinders
neither realists nor neorealists from attempting to of-
fer practical advice. It is therefore valuable not only
to consider the many and important theoretical and
doctrinal differences between various realists and neo-
realists, but also to consider the differences in the modes
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1 Thus, according to Kegley (1995, 8), “a theory of international
relations needs to perform four principal tasks. It should describe,
explain, predict, and prescribe.” In a more strongly moral tone, Waltz
(1954) proposed in his early work that “to explain how peace can be
more readily achieved [which, he implies, we all desire] requires an
understanding of the causes of war” (2). For a critique of neorealism
from the perspective of policy prescriptions, see Holsti 1995, 57–58.
For purposes of this argument, realism can include any of the four
types that Doyle (1997, 41–193) identifies.
in which their theories and doctrines can be delivered.
More specifically: What, if anything, must we add to
nomothetic statements and structural theories to pro-
vide practically useful (neo-)realist “policy” prescrip-
tions, and why?2
REALIST WISDOM AND MORAL WISDOM
My argument is that the practical wisdom of either re-
alism or neorealism must, by its nature, be commu-
nicated not merely through axioms, but also through
narrative, and that an example and justification of the
latter kind of communication may be found in Thucy-
dides’ realism as it is revealed in his History of the
Peloponnesian War.3 Nomothetic statements and theo-
retical frameworks remain insufficient. Two objections
against this claim immediately come to mind. First,
practical wisdom seems a questionable term to use in
the context of realist or, especially, neorealist theories
for two reasons. In the first place, realism (and here I
include neorealism) has been described on the moral
side as “skepticism regarding the applicability of eth-
ical norms to international policy” (Forde 1992, 373).
If we understand wisdom in a Platonic sense as the
2 A leading critical alternative to the realist and neorealist schools,
constructivism, is “interested in the construction of identities and
interests” in the international arena (Wendt 1994, 385). Because such
identities are constructed in large part through narratives, we might
expect narrative to appear more strongly in constructivist theory. The
renewed emphasis on culture and formative ideas in constructivism
would lead to the same expectation, since both are either formed in
narrative or embedded in it. In both cases, however, this expectation
remains unfulfilled at present (cf. Wendt 1999, in which no mention
of narrative appears), perhaps because constructivists like Wendt are
interested exclusively in explanation, not practical advice, and per-
haps because their theoretical commitments concerning constitutive
and causal science lead them to overlook or even reject narrative as
a core phenomenon for study and a core constitutent of explanation
itself. For example, Wendt’s (2001) most “pragmatic” article leaves
an unarticulated opening for narrative inquiry, but no more. Lebow’s
(2001) ingenious treatment of Thucydides as a constructivist analyzes
the narrative nomothetically with due sensitivity to the form of the
narrative itself (549) but without engaging in narrative analysis. As
constructivists move from analysis to prescription, one may expect
problems of narrative to press on them more explicitly. A renewed
appreciation for narrative as a political phenomenon worthy of at-
tention is apparent in the political studies of protest movements and
other domestic phenomena, but that work is tangential to my con-
cerns here (see Brysk 1995).
3 For purposes of this account, I take Thucydidean realism to be,
broadly speaking, what Doyle (1997, 41–92) takes it to be, and I take
Doyle’s description, broadly speaking, to be accurate.
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possession of practical moral knowledge concerning
the relationship between a concrete particular and a
possibly knowable whole, (neo-)realist moral skepti-
cism seems to exclude such wisdom as a possible human
virtue. Yet realists such as Machiavelli, Thucydides, and
Hobbes—none of them “Platonists”—explicitly sought
to teach us a kind of practical wisdom or prudence con-
cerning practical matters.4 Without assuming Platonic
categories, even this kind of wisdom implies an inkling
of a knowable whole within which particular words
and deeds of a person or a city must take place. At
a minimum, a wise person must understand the wider
consequences of particular words and deeds. For such
realists as Thucydides and Machiavelli, then, excellent
men are above all men of practical (not understood
“Platonically”) wisdom. They know what to do in accor-
dance with the requirements of the specific situation.
Traditionally, wisdom has included above all the ability
to distinguish between right and wrong, including the
right (or wise) and wrong (or foolish) use of power
(Strauss 1964, 7). But the moral skepticism of realism
and neorealism forces us to distinguish between prac-
tical wisdom concerning traditional moral matters—
whose possibility the (neo-)realist may deny—and
practical wisdom in “nonmoral,” but political matters—
whose possibility the (neo-)realist affirms and hopes to
teach.
Second, this separation from traditional moral wis-
dom seems to make realist and, especially, neorealist
wisdom merely a kind of technique (Forde 1992, 373;
Wiggins 1980, 221–40). Realism and neorealism do not
have an account of a final definitive moral human end
toward which we deliberate and act. Instead, human
ends are comprehended entirely within the field of the
material goods and power necessary for corporate and
individual survival and material flourishing. If gaining,
keeping, and maintaining power are the best we can do
concerning questions of the good or the bad, “wisdom”
may seem an odd term to employ here, especially since
the means of communicating moral wisdom would not
seem to be commensurate with the means of commu-
nicating realist “know-how” of what to do. And yet,
(neo-)realist deliberation about ends and means re-
garding power could be described in a manner similar
to the way in which Aristotle described deliberation
about moral matters. For example, practical wisdom,
deliberation, and choice are among the elements of
right action. Speaking anachronistically, Thucydides is
agreed with Aristotle that along with these elements,
education and natural endowment secure right action.5
And though human well-being is considered by the
(neo-)realist not in terms of eudaimonia or happiness,
but in terms of obtaining material goods, material se-
4 Compare Hobbes 1968, 82–84; Machiavelli 1980, 1–4 (“Epistle
Dedicatory”); Machiavelli 1996, 5–6 (“Preface”); 123–25 (“Pref-
ace”); and Thucydides 1982, I.22.4.
5 Sorabji (1980) and Wiggins (1980) provide a full examination of
these elements of Aristotle’s ethics. I take education to be an impor-
tant thrust of Thucydides’ History (I.22.4); we also find it important
in the writings of classical realists such as Machiavelli. (See the dedi-
cations and introductions of both The Prince [1980] and the Dis-
courses [1996].)
curity, and the reputation (honor) that comes with the
ability to do so,6 deliberation about material well-being
is in this way parallel to Aristotelian deliberation about
eudaimonia (Wiggins 1980, 227).
The second major objection to my argument has to
do with the necessary bases for practical deliberation.
Is narrative, in fact, one of them? Neorealists, repre-
sented most articulately by Kenneth Waltz, seem to
argue that the behavior of states, which are the only
significant actors in world politics, is driven by the sys-
temic imperatives defined by the distribution of capa-
bilities or the perception of such distribution among
the states of the world. To understand this principle
is to know how the international system works: Fur-
ther narration is superfluous.7 The most widely known
contemporary version of realism, articulated by Hans
Morgenthau, may give a similar impression that realist
practical wisdom or prudence also extends no further
than to short-hand formulae by which we may calculate
the logic of interstate (or interpolis or international)
affairs and then measure our actions by the necessity
of this logic. Morgenthau’s theoretical framework looks
something like this: (1) The political behavior of states
(and individuals) is governed by objective laws that are
grounded in human nature; (2) this behavior is first and
foremost determined by interest defined in terms of
power, (3) in their manifestations, neither interest nor
power remains either perennially stable or eternally
identical; (4) although political action may have moral
significance, morality and the necessities of political
effectiveness exist in tension at best; (5) the “moral
aspirations” of a particular political community are
not identical to universal moral laws, if such exist; and
(6) the political sphere of human activity—in which the
principle of interest defined in terms of power rules the
day—is autonomous (Morgenthau 1954, 1–11). Theo-
ries based on various or all of these premises—systems
theories of international relations, reductionist theories
of interstate behavior, various rational actor models,
and the like—presume to give us a measure of pre-
dictability concerning the outcome of interactor polit-
ical behavior.
Despite this famous list of realist principles,
Morgenthau remained skeptical about the sufficiency
of an axiomatic list for practical guidance (1946, esp.
204–23). In contrast to the neorealist presentation of
Waltz, Politics among Nations contains many historical
examples. Thus, Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International
Politics wants to steer us in the direction of logical ax-
ioms (65–67, 116–17, 127, 186–87) and ignore narrative
as a source of information altogether (Garst 2000, 78),
while Morgenthau lists such axioms,8 but then provides
6 Of the realist theorists, Hobbes (1968) most explicitly related honor
to power. “To pray for another, for ayde of any kind, is to Honor,
because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the
more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honor. To obey is to Honor;
because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to
help, or hurt them”(152). See also Thucydides 1982, III.39.5.
7 The refinements within neorealism, as, for example, in the typology
of Van Evera (1999, 7–11), do not materially affect the argument here.
8 The six items in Morgenthau’s list no doubt would have a different
meaning for him than for Waltz.
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us with an argument sprinkled throughout with anec-
dotes. Nevertheless, Morgenthau does not integrate
these stories into a narrative whole, and their narra-
tive function as a way of delivering practical (real-
ist) wisdom is understated and undertheorized, if it is
considered at all. The stories and illustrations even in
Morgenthau’s realist analysis of politics among
nations—to say nothing of Waltz’s much more sparse
neorealist argument—do not do the kind of work that
I argue here they must do in order for realist practi-
cal wisdom to become fully apparent and useable (cf.
Johnson 1993, 62, 70–71).
Statements by Thucydides and the characters of his
History in support of several of the realist theses enu-
merated above are readily available (1982, I.76–I.77;
V.89, 105.2, 107). Machiavelli similarly provides us
with a clear political calculus in the form of a num-
ber of maxims of political action that are consis-
tent with the aforesaid realist principles (Parel 1972,
7–12, 29–32). Likewise, Thomas Hobbes writes a trea-
tise that will teach his readers how one might “gov-
ern a whole Nation,” which includes a view to for-
eign powers (1968 [1651], 83, 227–28, 230–31, 257, 272,
375). All three writers, moreover, believed that their
works illustrated transhistorical principles based on a
knowledge of a human nature and a nature of po-
litical things that was not historically contingent, but
fairly constant, and that was not governed by uni-
versal moral laws, but by the autonomous workings
of the logic of political power. Human beings would
behave in similar ways in similar circumstances of
power relations (Hobbes 1968, 81–83, chap. 46, 727–28;
Machiavelli 1996, I.39; Thucydides 1982, I.22 4; cf. III.
82.2).
Yet while all three do provide general principles of
political action and human nature, none simply writes
out a list of maxims for us to follow. Thucydides writes a
History, which is primarily an account of human words
and deeds. It is the ultimate story that, better than any
other, illustrates “the human thing” (I.22). Machiavelli
delivers many maxims and proverbs to guide action, but
his works are largely made up of historical examples—
stories. To put his maxims and proverbs into action,
we require examples that we can follow. For Machi-
avelli, just as the science of medicine is “the experi-
ence of ancient physicians,” so statecraft requires for
its right practice examples (stories) of antiquity to im-
itate. The use of stories does not deny the possibility
of scientific rules of action, but it illustrates “the actual
context of [their] application” (Machiavelli 1996, 5–6,
123–25; Parel 1972, 10). Although Hobbes (1975a, 18)
writes careful philosophical treatises, he also translates
Thucydides’ History, summing up the practical use of
the History with the observation that “the narration
itself doth secretly instruct the reader, and more effec-
tually than can possibly be done by precept”. Even for
Hobbes, realism must be contextually displayed: “For
the principal and proper work of history being to in-
struct and enable men, but the knowledge of actions
past, to bear themselves prudently in the present and
providently towards the future: there is not extant any
other (merely human) that doth more naturally and
fully perform it, than this of my author [Thucydides].”9
Stories give us practical wisdom in a way that is central
to the realists’ distinct concerns. Just as neorealists miss
the importance of the speeches that Thucydides records
for an understanding of Thucydidean realism (Garst
1989, 3–27), so too do they miss the role that narrative
plays in delivering the practical wisdom of his (and their
own) realism. The kind of narrative that Thucydides
provides, richly reflecting the reality of international
politics and human agency, accident, chance, and con-
tingency within those politics, must augment any ax-
iomatic or even anecdotal account of such politics.10
The scope of this argument suggests an extended
monograph, but I restrict myself to a “case study.” To
demonstrate the argument, I examine for its illumina-
tion of practical wisdom the story of the Spartan gen-
eral Brasidas, who, despite his ultimate demise and po-
litical shortcomings, Thucydides represents as among
the most excellent of the Spartans. This approach it-
self seems open at the outset to at least two objections.
First, an extensive and growing literature that explores
the literary techniques Thucydides used to answer the
question “What happened?” finds in his mode of pre-
sentation a series of patterns, reversals, symmetries,
deliberate asymmetries, and disjunctions that together
reveal his thought. Participants in this literature do not
necessarily agree with each other in either the details,
the larger patterns, or even the general “lessons” in
them that Thucydides intends to deliver to his readers.11
Nevertheless, all could lend support to an argument
(although not all intend to do so) that the lessons of
Thucydides are not found in details of what, when, and
how so-and-so did such-and-such, but in the broad pat-
terns of behavior, action, and response among contend-
ing polities that together weave the fabric of the War.
And yet, regardless how we may interpret these larger
patterns, they are made up not merely of broad and
vaguely defined “forces” that affect human life, but of
the speeches and actions of individuals. Cogan (1981),
in particular, has shown Thucydides’ intense interest in
the role individual words and deeds play in initiating
larger movements of people and communities and in
determining their fates (cf. Garst 1989). Telling stories
of individual lives and sketching broader historical or
behavioral patterns are not mutually exclusive.
Second, and more specifically, the Thucydidean
case I have chosen—Brasidas—seems particularly
9 Hobbes 1975b, 6; cf. 17, “In sum, if the truth of history did ever ap-
pear by the manner of relating, it doth so in this history: so coherent,
perspicuous and persuasive is the whole narration, and every part
thereof.”
10 “Counsel, woven into the fabric of life as it is lived, is wisdom”
(Benjamin 1972, 442). My argument here implies a critique even of
Machiavelli on this score; his anecdotal method (in which the his-
torical accuracy and practical advice of specific anecdotes are clearly
open to question) can give rise to highly intelligent interpretations
that need to consider narrative nearly not at all. See, for example, the
mischievous interpretation by Mary Dietz (1986), on the one hand,
and the numerological aspects of the interpretation by Leo Strauss
(1958), on the other.
11 Connor (1984), Cornford (1907), Edmunds (1975a), Hunter
(1973), and Rawlings (1981) are among the important contributors
to this tradition.
123
Realism, Narrative, and Happenstance February 2004
vulnerable to an objection that this “minibiography”
is only a vehicle for pointing to wider concerns. In this
vein, Robert Connor argues that Thucydides is not es-
pecially interested in Brasidas and that he intends “not
to affirm Brasidas’ virtues, but to lead the reader from
a recognition of these qualities to an appreciation of
their long-run importance.” This argument is compat-
ible with my purpose. It is, after all, within a larger
context that the actions of the individual are rendered
intelligible and useful for practical lessons of conduct.
Connor (1984, 130–31) pushes the argument with the
claim that Thucydides’ comments about Brasidas are
neither in praise nor in blame of him, but to emphasize
Brasidas’ importance in the greater trends of the war.
Here, I think, Connor overstates his case. We can isolate
the story of Brasidas, as I have done, and find there a
roughly complete picture of the man. Thus, to reject
his interest in Brasidas, we must assume a priori that
Thucydides is concerned only with larger patterns and
that his focus is essentially on the cities, without any
real interest in the character of Brasidas. The larger
perspective is undeniably present, but my interest is in
how Brasidas interacts with that context, and it seems
to me that Thucydides also had an interest in that di-
rection, so that critical interest in Brasidas is not off the
mark as Connor suggests.
Brasidas was the direct opponent of Thucydides dur-
ing the engagements around Amphipolis and Eion
(IV. 104–IV.107). The Athenian demos mistakenly at-
tributed the loss of Amphipolis directly to Thucy-
dides, for which it exiled him for 20 years, thereby—
ironically—giving him the leisure to write his History.
This “personal” connection to Brasidas makes it even
less likely that Thucydides had no specific interest in
him unless we again make Connor’s a priori assump-
tion, but it also raises a new complication: Is Thucy-
dides’ account of Brasidas self-exculpatory? There is
scant evidence in the narrative to support such a charge:
Thucydides was careful to lay out pertinent details of
the campaign that his readers could check indepen-
dently. Furthermore, while a case study of the career
of Brasidas reveals important lessons of the History,
Thucydides does not elevate the role of Brasidas in the
overall narrative either negatively or positively beyond
what the actions and qualities of Brasidas, separate and
apart from this “personal” connection, would seem to
allow.12
Finally, Thucydides’ thematic treatment of Brasi-
das parallels his treatment of another leading charac-
ter in the History: the Athenian leader, Nicias. Both
figures clearly display traits of the city—Athens or
Sparta—against which they are fighting. These oppos-
ing sets of traits are a major theme of the History.
Brasidas displays his “Athenian” traits with success,
whereas the “Spartan” traits—hesitation, caution, and
superstition—of Nicias magnify the scope of the
Athenian disaster in Sicily.13 Similarly, Brasidas is set in
deliberate, ironic contrast with Cleon. Further (ironic)
12 But see also Palmer 1992, 6–8.
13 While Thucydides uses somewhat different language to describe
the career of the Athenian general Demosthenes and does not pro-
parallels with Demosthenes and Pericles are also pos-
sible to discern.14 These broader thematic contrasts,
which space considerations force us to leave aside here,
are additional grounds for considering the career of
Brasidas as a source for practical wisdom.
This essay is a reconsideration of the mode in which
realist and neorealist wisdom in general must be pre-
sented, taking its point of departure from a specific case
that illustrates the complex contextual interactions of
luck and excellence. This cannot be an objectionable
procedure if we remain aware that traditional realists
do not all write in the same way and that their visions
of the world are not all identical. Indeed, as Steven
Forde (1992) argues in his magisterial comparison of
Thucydides and Machiavelli, it is precisely in the lit-
erary presentation itself that one may discern crucial
differences between various kinds of realism (381, 382–
25; cf. Palmer 1989).
BRASIDAS: CHANCE [TYCHE ] AND
EXCELLENCE IN COMPLEX CONTEXT
What does the story of Brasidas tell us about the world
that a set of axioms or maxims would not? Brasidas
seems an unlikely character to choose as a paradigm
of excellence in practical wisdom. Not only may his
role in Thucydides’ larger narrative be open to some
question, but also he dies without realizing his goals,
which are themselves somewhat questionable. The ex-
tent and nature of Brasidas’ “failure,” however, are less
than clear, and this ambiguity is itself an aspect of the
narrative that is meant to teach us something.
Thucydides’ story of Brasidas is part of a larger one—
the story of the greatest motion [kinesis] or of the great-
est war ever. It was the war between the Athenians and
the Spartans and their allies, whose underlying cause
[prophasis] was the Spartan fear of Athenian imperial
expansion (I.23.6, I.88, 118.2). When we first encounter
Brasidas in Thucydides’ History, it is the first year of the
war (432/1 B.C.E.). The Thebans, allies of the Spartans,
have made their initial, unsuccessful attempt to subdue
Plataea in the first overt act of war. Both sides have
begun all-out preparations for war, and approximately
80 days after the first Theban attempt on Plataea, the
Spartans invade Attica (II.7.1, II.19.1). By invading and
ravaging the Attic plain, the Spartans hope to entice the
Athenians into an open, general armed conflict, which
both the Athenian leader, Pericles, and the Spartan
generals estimate that the Spartans would surely win
vide his own estimation of the man as he does for Brasidas, one
might also lay these two careers alongside one another to good
comparative—perhaps even ironic—effect. Tracing the career of De-
mosthenes through the Aetolian campaign, the actions at Pylos, and
the expedition to Sicily is instructive, both by itself and in comparison
to other careers, as is comparing those careers among each other.
The Syracusans butcher Demosthenes along with Nicias after the
final Athenian surrender in Sicily, despite the efforts of the Spartan
general Gyllipus specifically to save them both (VII.86).
14 His overstatement regarding Thucydides’ disinterest in Brasidas
nothwithstanding, Connor (1984) is convincing on the structural roles
that Brasidas plays in the narrative (126–31, 140). Such roles do not
seem to me to negate other levels of authorial interest.
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(II.13.2–3, II.12.6–8).15 In response to the Spartan in-
vasion (II.23.1), a sizable Athenian marine expedition
makes landings along the Peloponnesian coast and rav-
ages the proximate territory, thereby avenging the in-
vasion and demonstrating to the Spartans the potential
costliness to them of the war (II.25.1; Kagan 1974, 58).
Enter Brasidas.
The reader’s first encounter is unique in at least two
respects. First, Brasidas emerges suddenly and by hap-
penstance in the narrative. Having “cruised about the
coasts and ravaged the country,” the Athenians landed
at Methone, and “it so happened” [etyche] that Brasi-
das, son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, was in command
of a guard for this district. Etyche—“he/it chanced”—
is the first word concerning Brasidas. As with the hap-
penstance of birth, Brasidas does not choose his own
appearance into the deeds [erga] of the narrative, but
“happens to be” in the right place at the right time, and
he has an immediate military success. Hearing of the
Athenian attack, he hurriedly and with little apparent
planning throws himself into the threatened city, secur-
ing it against the distracted Athenians. While his fame
or glory may begin with the lucky occurrence of a mili-
tary encounter, Brasidas possesses the necessary qual-
ities for taking hold of happenstance and succeeding.
His “daring exploit” wins him the “thanks of Sparta,”
which is an honor both generally and specifically: He
is “the first officer who obtained this notice during the
war.”
Second, the reader’s first encounter with Brasidas is
set off in sharp contrast with Thucydides’ description
of the Spartan general Archidamus only a few para-
graphs earlier (II.18, II.20). The verbs and adverbs tell
the story. Archidamus with his large force wastes time
delaying, loitering, proceeding slowly, procrastinating.
He plans carefully (II.20), but his slowness earns him
the “gravest censure” of the Spartans (II.18).16
Thucydides’ introductions of his characters often
provide clues to what he thinks of them. Nicias, for
example, is a central character in the History whose hes-
itation in Sicily leads to the annihilation of the Athenian
army; he is introduced to us in seven separate actions
of a wide variety before we first hear him speak in a
very cautious speech (Strauss 1964, 202). Thucydides
makes sure to let us know that Nicias is a man not of
hesitation, but of action and moderation. His hesita-
tion and moderate speech appear not to be a display of
weak character but are prudential and circumstantial,
and we know this, because his call for moderation is
preceded by seven actions that show that his modera-
15 For a general but precise discussion of the various strategies and
issues involved, see Kagan (1974, 17–69).
16 We find a parallel story in the high admiralship of Alcidas in the
fifth year of the war (III.28–III.33). Edmunds (1975a, 80) points out
that Thucydides attributes “intelligence” [to zuneton] to Archidamus
and Brasidas, among others, and that only Archidamus is mentioned
as having both this quality and moderation in combination. In fact,
Thucydides does not attribute these to Archidamus but states that
he was “reputed” [dokon einai] to have them (I.79.2). Archidamus’
deeds then put this reputation to the question. Thucydides’ attitude
toward reputed events and characteristics is demonstrated in I.20 and
VI.5460.
tion is neither cowardice nor laziness. Similarly, we first
meet Cleon, another central character, as he is mak-
ing a speech advocating the death of the Mitylenians
for their revolt against Athens. Thucydides introduces
him as “the most violent man at Athens.” His violence,
Thucydides implies, is a violence of speech and not
deeds. In contrast to men like Nicias and Brasidas,
Cleon would prefer to leave deeds to others (IV.27–
IV.28).17 In this vein, Brasidas is a man of action, and
he is so introduced. Even his speeches are not delivered
in debate, but are exhortations or declarations with the
express purpose of accomplishing an immediate, pre-
determined end. The action of Brasidas, moreover, is
closely linked to the luck of his appearance; his success
is bound up with the audacity and swiftness with which
he takes advantage of tyche.
Brasidas’ success at Methone was not decisive, since
the Athenians continued their raiding (II.25.5, II.30.1),
but it was, as Gomme (1954, 130–32) notes, a foreshad-
owing of things to come. Not for the last time, Brasidas
had surprised the Athenians and upset their plans. The
incident at Methone is the first of five that make up the
first half of Thucydides’ “biography” of Brasidas; the
second half is a protracted campaign in Thrace. After
Methone, Brasidas disappears from the narrative until
the third year of the war. He reappears in the story of
a defeat, brought on by (bad) luck. In the third nar-
rative, Spartan lack of resolve and fear of risk bungle
an opportunity to take the Piraeus, Athens’ own port
(II.93–II.94.1). In the fourth story, the disposition of
the Spartan high admiral, Alcidas, which was similar
to that of Archidamus—hesitant (III.27.1), slow to act
(III.29.1), overly cautious (III.31), and politically inept
(III.32), so that Thucydides’ illustrations of his blun-
dering caution let one nearly think he was a coward
(III.31.2, III.33.1, III.69.1)—makes Brasidas’ attempts
at prudent counseling ineffective. In the fifth episode,
Brasidas’ minor but noteworthy part in the crushing
Spartan defeat at Sphacteria (IV.15) lets Thucydides
claim that of all those who took part in the battle, Brasi-
das most distinguished himself (IV.11.3–4). In these
first five incidents, then (which we cannot recount fully
here), Brasidas succeeds once, and on four occasions
he or those he is with are defeated. Until his death,
however, Brasidas suffers serious defeat only when he
remains part of a larger Spartan contingent and cannot
act independently. In every case, his energetic actions
and speech are contrasted with the more common Spar-
tan demeanor of caution and slowness. Two of these
incidents expressly exhibit the role happenstance plays
in bringing success or failure to excellence. In one case
luck is on the side of Brasidas; in the other it is not.
These first five episodes constitute, as it were, the
first “act” of the drama of Brasidas. Thucydides’ only
explicit statement of evaluation about Brasidas’ quali-
ties in this first act comes in the fifth episode, where he
points out Brasidas’ distinction among the Spartans at
Sphacteria. But by drawing the contrasts that he does
in the stories, and by relating the incidents to us in
17 On Thucydides’ possibly unfair treatment of Cleon and its basis,
see Kagan 1981, 323–24.
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the way that he does, Thucydides seeks to teach us
about excellence in warcraft and statecraft. Brasidas’
virtues include an ability to speak, initiative and speed,
alertness and audacity, courage, strategic skill, and in-
telligence. The narrative shows us how these qualities
operate in the actual (“realist”) world of power politics,
contingency, and luck. Together, these qualities may not
yet make a thoroughly wise man, but they may make
an excellent one, or, at the very least, a “resplendent”
one (Orwin 1995, 79). We find the remaining qualities
needed to make a man of practical wisdom in the sec-
ond half of Thucydides’ biography of Brasidas, where
the excellence of Brasidas manifests itself in full in the
campaign in Thrace.
Thucydides indicates a new beginning, or a second
act, with the reintroduction of Brasidas in the eighth
year of the war. The bulk of Thucydides’ narrative from
this point in Book IV until Book V.20, which brings us
to the tenth year of the war and the so-called Peace of
Nicias, is concerned with Brasidas. The sentence that
begins this second story of Brasidas contains striking
common elements with the introductory sentence of
our very first encounter. The situation, moreover, is
similar to the first. The Athenians have hatched a plot
to take Megara, and they have succeeded in capturing
Nisaea, its port. “Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Lacedaemo-
nian, at this time happened to be [etyche] in the neigh-
borhood” (IV.70.1). Thucydides fully reintroduces
Brasidas, who again “happens to be” in the right place
at the right time. He is on other business, but success in
this affair can only bolster his prestige as he continues
with preparations for Thrace. With the haste and clever
strategy of the first incident at Methone, Brasidas pro-
ceeds against the Athenians. The Megarians, embroiled
in a factional conflict that is part of the Athenian plot,
refuse him entry into the city, so he moves to another
strategy: He fortifies his position and waits. Brasidas
wins the waiting game; the Athenians, being outnum-
bered with the arrival of Brasidas’ forces and no longer
holding the advantage of surprise, (once again) do not
desire a pitched battle with the Spartans and, so, with-
draw (IV.72.4; Kagan 1981, 276–78). The campaign in
Thrace can now proceed. The story illustrates the prac-
tical wisdom of Brasidas: His audacity and penchant
for quick action do not overcome his better judgment,
so when the situation calls for patient waiting, he waits.
According to Thucydides, Brasidas was sent to
Thrace because he wanted to go. This desire is a fur-
ther indication of his daring and initiative. The unlikely
and dangerous campaign served at least two impor-
tant purposes for the Spartans: It relieved them of the
threat of a Helot revolt (IV.80.5), and by shifting the
focus of military activities to the north, it might relieve
somewhat the pressure Athenian raiding from Pylos
and Cythera was placing on the Peloponnese (IV.80.1).
It appears to have achieved both of these objectives
and two more: The Spartan-induced revolt of these
strategically critical cities from the Athenian empire
gave them something with which to bargain when they
eventually concluded an armistice with the Athenians,
and in the second installment of the war (the so-called
Decelean War), “it was the virtue and intelligence [arête
kai xynesis] that Brasidas had displayed at this time—
qualities of which some had experience, while others
knew of them by report—that did most to inspire in
the allies of the Athenians a sentiment favorable to the
[Spartans]” (IV.81.2).18
Brasidas demonstrated all of his usual qualities dur-
ing the campaign, and his “comprehension” or “intelli-
gence” [xynesis] and his “goodness” [agathon] proved
him to be a wise man as well. His intelligence is dis-
played in his ability to speak well. On his way to Thrace,
he had to pass through Thessalian territory, where the
democratic faction was hostile to Spartan intentions.
Stopped by a party of the democrats, he was able with a
clever speech to persuade them to let him pass through
(quickly) without bloodshed. Having reached Thrace,
he was able, again without the use of force, to persuade
a number of the cities there to rebel against Athens.
Brasidas’ rhetorical skill leads Thucydides to observe—
it is unclear, Kagan says, whether with “delicious irony
or condescension”—that he was “not a bad speaker
for a Spartan.”19 Thus, his “seductive, though untrue
statements” in some instances (IV.108.5), his skillful
combination of threats and promises on other occa-
sions (IV.86.1–2, 87.1–7), and his seeming integrity and
measuredness20 (IV.81.2, 3) led Thucydides to conclude
that Brasidas was successful because he “in other things
showed himself measured, and in his declarations ev-
erywhere made plain that he had been sent out for the
liberation of Hellas” (IV.108.2). Thucydides contrasts
the tactful intelligence of Brasidas with the impatience
and violence of Polydamus, the Spartan commander
at Mende,21 whose angry behavior is instrumental in
creating a factional conflict within the city that results
in its fall to the Athenians, who have come to recover it
to their empire (IV.130; Kagan 1981, 313). The outcome
of Brasidas’ actions earlier in the campaign had been
much different: “The towns subject to the Athenians,
hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms
accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt
most strongly encouraged to change their condition,
and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come to
them, each wishing to be the first to revolt.” Finally, the
successes of Brasidas in Thrace are clearly contrasted
against the concurrent mood of the Spartans, who had
been entirely unnerved by the string of Athenian suc-
cesses that included above all the occupation of Pylos
(IV.55.1–4).
The crowning achievement of Brasidas’ campaign
was the capture of Amphipolis. Bit by bit his victories
18 For further details of the strategic considerations in this campaign,
see Kagan 1981, 288–94.
19 Kagan 1981, 293n110, and Thucydides 1919, IV.84.2; cf. IV.85–
IV.88. For an analysis of Brasidas’ apparent audacity in at least one
speech, see Orwin 1995, 84.
20 Metria may be translated as “moderation,” which is preferred by
Crawley (Thucydides 1982) and Smith (Thucydides 1919). Palmer
(1992, 38, 130n31), however, makes a convincing case for translating
metrios as “measured,” especially in the Thucydidean context, while
using “moderation” to translate sophrosyne (also “temperance”),
and for recognizing the importance of the distinctions between them.
I follow his lead here.
21 Rawlings (1981) argues that he was not a Spartan (241–42).
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distracted, then annoyed, then seriously threatened the
Athenians.22 Amphipolis was a key city for the Athe-
nians: Its capture could interfere with the grain supply
from the north. To capture it, Brasidas relied on in-
ternal treachery and surprise, which alone would have
succeeded, according to Thucydides, but Brasidas for
once delayed, “vainly waiting for a demonstration on
the part of his friends within” (IV.104.2). When his par-
tisans did not fulfill their part of the plan, he “offered
measured terms” to the Amphipolitans, who, surprised
at the fairness of the terms “in comparison with what
their fear had suggested,” gave him the city (IV.106.1).
Unable to complete the task with the usual sort of mil-
itary strategy, Brasidas turned to the persuasiveness of
measured (but deceptive) speech.
Having briefly recounted the story of Brasidas, we
may now fairly ask, What do we learn from it that a
straightforward list of axioms would not tell us? Thucy-
dides delivers to us a kind of catalog of virtues (ex-
cellences) in his narrative of Brasidas’ life. We learn
from his story that Brasidas is conspicuous among the
Spartans for his ability to speak (not always truthfully)
(IV.84.2, IV.88.1, IV.108.5, IV.121.1), his valor (IV.2.4),
his energy (IV.81.1), his apparent justice (IV.81.2), his
measured conduct (IV.81.2, IV.108.2), his goodness in
all things (IV.81.3), his gentleness (IV.108.3), his ini-
tiative (II.25, V.10.5), his superior strategic abilities
(IV.128.1), and his good fortune (IV.117.2). Thucydides
seems to share Aristotle’s understanding two genera-
tions later that the best sort of citizen is the one who best
serves his city or regime.23 If fear, honor, and interest
are the principal motivations of political action, and if
they are premised on the primary necessity of securing
power that is not self-defeating or self-corrupting for
the city or the state (which is therefore the chief object
of political action), then the best Spartan is the one
who best accomplishes the political ends of Sparta. In
Thucydides’ estimation, it appears that Brasidas was
such a man. His excellences ranked him among the
most excellent Spartans. His speeches and his displays
of measured conduct, justice, and goodness also showed
him to be wise. Such displays, however, are not the
same as actually possessing these qualities, a problem
to which we will return.
(REALIST) WISDOM AND NARRATIVE
The nature and role of narrative—a summary term for
all of the “things” that are “going on” at “the same
time” in a story—have not been entirely neglected,
but certainly underrated among political theorists and
political scientists alike. Recent studies in a variety of
academic fields have reestablished the importance of
narratives to our understanding of political phenomena
from the perspective of practitioners and scholars.24
22 IV.108.1. For an analysis of Thucydides’ manner of telling this story,
see Gomme 1954, 136–37.
23 Aristotle 1984, 1276b16–35. Aristotle is also careful to distinguish
this sort of “best” from the morally best (1276b. 16–35). Compare
Thucydides (1919, VI.54, VI.14).
24 Examples include the many instances in the summary article by
Brysk (1995), Frei 1974, and Ricoeur 1991.
The reasons for underestimating the role of narra-
tive are neither obscure nor mendacious. Both political
science and political philosophy are largely analytical
activities. Analytical categories and the techniques of
dialectical theorization, not stories, are the modes of
investigation and explanation. Yet underlying both En-
lightenment and positivist science, on the one hand,
and the analytical dialogues and treatises of philosophy
beginning with Plato, on the other,25 is a series of base
stories or metanarratives without which these activities
and their written products would be unintelligible.26
Stories are not entirely superseded even in our social
sciences.
But why narrative? Is it fair to argue that theoreti-
cal guidance is inadequate, no matter how theoretically
complex or valid such guidance might be? Since inter-
pretation itself is contingent—as Thucydides himself
admits—and since the wisdom that comes from such
contingent interpretation seems to be highly variable,
does narration really provide any useful guidance? Nar-
rative guidance, moreover, means not merely making
sense of a “given” past, but making sense of an as yet
unknown future, which is to say, of events that are not
yet the subject of a narrative history. Can narrative ac-
complish this task?
It would seem that we do not require a story for
the kind of catalog of the virtues I have listed. The
list and brief explanations of its contents are all that
is required to tell us what we should do if we wish to
achieve success in preserving our polity in a complex
and anarchic world in which politics are circumscribed
by the necessities of fear, honor, and interest and af-
fected by the vagaries of seemingly random events. Not
so: The story itself serves to render intelligible the func-
tion or meaning of Brasidas’ virtues—whether actual or
apparent—in ways that merely listing them would not.
With regard to our concern for practical guidance, to
know what a virtue is and to know how it functions
are to know what one looks like in practice. It is only
in a story of how a virtue manifests itself in the midst
of the contingencies and complex, multilayered human
encounters that we can learn anything practical, not
to say intelligible, about it or from it (MacIntyre 1984,
esp. 204–20).
While the nomothetic theories of realism and neo-
realism may be a good start, they are insufficient for
giving statesmen practical advice, and they are too thin
an account of the world of political action to give schol-
ars sufficient purchase on the context and possibilities
of such action. Were it not for the fact that nearly all
realists and neorealists seem to think that their theories
should have practical effects, this insufficiency would
perhaps be inconsequential for (academic) realism and
neorealism. The need for stories on this practical level
emerges most immediately out of the practical need to
marshal personal and material resources to engage the
world successfully. This need becomes more evident
25 The narrative character of Plato’s dialogues does not vitiate the
claim that an analytical investigation remains at their dialogical core.
26 For expositions of such metanarratives, see, for example, Milbank
1990; Mitchell 1993, 1–18, 46–97; and Waterman 1991.
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when we notice that two overwhelming accompani-
ments of the principles of action and motivation in the
world of human beings are the presence of indetermi-
nacy or contingency, and complexity. To overcome the
workings of contingency, happenstance, or luck amidst
a complex necessity requires the practical wisdom that
points to success, which is constituted by more than the
predictive axioms that we find, say, in the theories of
Waltz.27 Narrative provides the materials that theoreti-
cal analysis dissects. It precedes such analysis, and only
in the context of narrative can such an analysis retain
its coherence. Because we are contingent beings who
are temporally constituted, we need narrative to make
sense of our existence. Indeed, our temporal existence
means that our lives are at root narratively formed,
so that the narratives we render to make sense of our
existence are but reflections of the deeper narrative—
elusive as that may be—that is our existence.
This centrality of narrative leads to three more spe-
cific claims. First, Thucydides, who remains one of the
foremost thinkers of the so-called realist tradition in po-
litical thought, confronted these questions and treated
them in a way that deserves a kind of attention among
modern scholars of international relations it has not
received. Second, narrative is the specific way in which
the problem of human excellence as a means to success
is illustrated and explored for purposes of practical ad-
vice in Thucydides, and it cannot be otherwise. For if
the wisdom of realism is, in fact, a kind of practical
wisdom, then we may assume that the principles of
transmitting such wisdom and of deliberating wisely
hold true for realist wisdom as they do for traditional
practical moral wisdom. And here again, even Aris-
totle, although his discussion of ethics is presented in
the form of demonstrative, analytical treatises and not
stories, suggests that the virtuous or excellent life begins
with a model of the good man. To live a virtuous life is
to live as a good man would (Aristotle 1962, 1105b5–
9, 1140a24). Such models are only partially made ac-
cessible to us by means of lists of axioms. Ultimately,
we require either direct, sustained observation of “role
models” or apprenticeships under such men, or, failing
such opportunity, we require as a substitute at least
such stories about them as realists like Hobbes praise
and Thucydides and Machiavelli tell, albeit in radically
different ways and for significantly different practical
and even moral purposes (cf. Kahn 1994, 545–56, 553–
54; Palmer 1989).
Third, and most importantly, Thucydides implies that
the possibilities of human excellence and the success it
brings are substantially attenuated by the radical con-
tingency that is woven into the fabric of human ex-
istence, and he proposes to tell his readers stories as
one way of communicating the characteristics of human
excellence, which is so fragile and yet so necessary for
successfully accomplishing one’s ends in the world.28
The importance of considering the Thucydidean pre-
27 We recall again Morgenthau’s (1946) skepticism regarding the suf-
ficiency of axioms for practical guidance (204–23).
28 For a catalog of Thucydides’ uses of “arête,” see Palmer 1989,
368–71.
sentation of realist wisdom is that the kind of excel-
lence we think is possible circumscribes the kinds of
human actions—including political and military—we
think are possible and desirable. Accordingly, the ques-
tion of excellence and how to illustrate it remains a
question for students of international relations and
political philosophy alike, but also for policy makers
and political leaders. As Waltz (1988) points out, his
neorealist theory is an effort to “explain how the or-
ganization of a realm acts as a constraining and dis-
posing force on the interacting units within it” (618).
Structure almost always leaves some room for indi-
vidual initiative and chance, and stories pick up this
key point by displaying the ways in which individuals
maneuver within structural constraints and within the
vagaries of contingency. Good statesmanship, more-
over, does not necessarily lead to political or mili-
tary success: Thucydides, along with later realists like
Machiavelli, was keenly interested in understanding
why.
This argument is not some entirely new reading or
interpretation of Thucydides or realism and neore-
alism in general; it shows, rather, that by examining
his storytelling, we discover a necessary dimension of
prescriptive realism and neorealism that has remained
under-appreciated in the secondary literature. Uncov-
ering this dimension adds a needed caveat to a realist
or neorealist theory of international politics that would
too readily disparage the “role of the accidental and the
occurrence of the unexpected” so as not to “dampen
[our] theoretical aspirations” (Waltz 1995, 71). I am not
suggesting that the accidental should overtake theory,
nor should stories exclude other ways of communicat-
ing what we are calling practical wisdom or prudence in
the light of the accidental; rather, taking the accidental
into account is a vital part of realist wisdom, and narra-
tive is a crucial mode of communicating such wisdom,
even while nomothetic theories may continue to hold
first place as the “necessarily slender explanatory con-
struct[s]” with which we begin and end (Waltz 1995,
75). Narratives, anecdotal compilations, theories, and
the conclusions of theoretical analysis are all, for better
or worse, either forms of knowledge or the media for
specific kinds of knowledge. As Nietzsche argued so
eloquently, every form or medium of knowledge is a
way of both seeing and not seeing (cf. Nietzsche, 1983,
59ff.; 1968, 470 [sect. 24]; 1966, 9–32). Stories, in partic-
ular, can exhibit not only explanatory constructs, but
also sensibilities, through which authors can teach their
readers.
The need for stories as transmitters of wisdom rests
on four general characteristics of narrative. First, sto-
ries display particularities in such a way as to shed light
on the complex generalities that constitute the con-
text of the particulars. They permit a kind of inductive
reasoning. From a story we may derive one or more
general, probabilistic principles of human conduct, but
we also retain the complex context of such principles
for action. The narrated events of a story are “re-
vealed as possessing a structure, an order of meaning”
by the narrative itself and which they do not possess
as “real events” apart from some narrativized content
128
American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 1
(White 1987, 4, 5). Stories become a guide for prudent
deliberation about what to do in similar circumstances
(Cogan 1981, 232–38). Whereas we may glean axioms,
maxims, or abstract principles from a story, it is the story
itself that provides the context that permits judgments
about what axiom to follow in what way in a specific
instance.
Second, stories display the essentially contingent
character of human life, but they weave the contingent
occurrences of our experiences into a comprehensible
whole. Stories “disclose a world in which its readers
are invited to dwell, or a character in relation to whom
the readers are asked to see themselves.” Thus, a story
becomes “a context for reflection and action” (C. Wood
1987, 12). In this way, a story is not first and foremost
a work of abstract reason specifically, but of what we
might call such intelligence generally. Whereas the no-
tion of reason is a particular philosophical construct
with clear implications about the structure of the ra-
tional mind and what it perceives or can perceive, the
general concept of intelligence is broader. Intelligence
on this count is “a working endowment rather than a
theory and can be active in the absence of a philosoph-
ical theory about the rationality of the universe and the
structure of mind that enables it to grasp the rationality
inherent in the world.” We might call intelligence “a
quality of brightness that enables all normal human
beings to some extent and some to an extraordinary
extent to grasp relations and implications in complex
situations” (Wyschogrod 1983, 5).
In terms of astory, then, it follows “[f]rom this intel-
ligible character of the plot” that “the ability to fol-
low a story constitutes a very sophisticated from of
understanding” (Ricoeur 1991, 4). Such a notion of
intelligence or understanding, which is embodied in
stories, makes it the foremost constituent of wisdom.
It gives us a wider sense of human knowledge and
wisdom than analytical reason alone, especially with
regard to the role of narrative in providing the insights
of wisdom. Both in its accessibility to induction and
in its display of contingencies within a larger whole,
narrative provides a context within which actions and
events can be understood. It may also provide a con-
text that clarifies for us why some phenomena remain
quizzical or even incomprehensible. One such mys-
tery concerns the phenomenon of radical contin-
gency within a complex context and successful action
against it.
Third, then, narrative is prior to analysis and the
axioms it produces. Analysis is the activity, as its et-
ymology indicates, of “loosening up” the narrative,
which includes discerning its parts, testing them for
conceptual coherence and consistency in usage, and
unearthing the logic of the story. Out of such analysis,
which is a critical reflection on the story being told, may
come prescriptive axioms of behavior. Both the analysis
and its axiomatic results, however, are “nonnarrative
mode[s] of discourse” that depend on a prior narrative
for their comprehensibility (Lash 1982, 76). Accord-
ingly, we may note that neither Morgenthau nor even
Waltz can either derive or present their theories with-
out reference to examples and illustrations, e.g., stories
(Morgenthau 1954; Waltz 1988, 620–28).29 Narrative is
in this case the instrument for concretizing theory.
Fourth, if stories are not theoretically (or analyti-
cally) precise, and yet remain intelligent and intelligi-
ble, then they illuminate in a particular way. One quality
of wisdom is that it “cannot be said . . . but only done
or practiced.” This implies that while axioms may help
us, we can ultimately make our wisdom visible to others
only indirectly or reflectively (Strauss 1989, 91). Stories
are such reflections of wisdom by indirection, because
they form, as it were, a “Gestalt” of the world. Thucy-
dides used illuminating stories, because the nature of
that on which he sought to shed light is more accessible
to the intelligence of narrative than the strictures of
rational, categorical theorizing. In stories we hear the
words and see the deeds that manifest wisdom or its
absence. Wise proverbs are guiding maxims, the past
practice and future reference of which are manifested
in the words and deeds of our experiences or of a nar-
rative. The meaning and substance of prudence and
choice are made known to us in a narrative that in-
tegrates the words and deeds that constitute prudence
into a context that serves to make sense of the world for
us: “Ultimately, history cannot make a complete break
with narrative, because it cannot break with action,
which itself implies agents, aims, circumstances, inter-
actions, and results both intended and unintended. But
the plot is the basic narrative unity that organizes these
heterogeneous ingredients into an intelligible totality”
(Ricoeur 1991, 5; cf. Hauerwas 1983, 38–44).
In the context of their plot, stories contain a subject,
which is sometimes a group but most often an indi-
vidual. For our purposes, the storied activities of such
groups or individuals satisfy the need of the decision-
maker to be given illustrations of principles. Since sci-
entific realism does not explicitly examine the role of
group behavior or individual action, it seems to offer
little for the individual decision-maker beyond a justifi-
cation for resignation. Scientific realism and neorealism
articulate the structural constraints of a system; they
may leave room for action and for chance, but that is
not their concern.30 Morgenthau and Waltz, for exam-
ple, tell leaders what is beyond their control—which is
important. But what such leaders also want to know
is what to do with that which is within their control.
To that end, they must observe the prudent and excel-
lent actor, the wise man, to become wise themselves.
Machiavelli, Thucydides, and Hobbes, among others,
all claimed to have observed, to have become wise, and
to have passed on to us (in very different ways) the
words and deeds they saw or about which they read, so
that we, too, might become wise.31
In summary, then, a narrative is a particular way of
answering the question, “What happened?” It is a way
29 A more explicity “narrational” explication of realism may be
found in Carr 1964, esp. 22–94.
30 “To realize the possibility [of systems theory] requires conceiving
of an international system’s structure and showing how it works its
effects” (Waltz 1979, 69).
31 Hobbes 1968, 82–83; Machiavelli 1996, 5–6, 123–25; Thucydides
1919, I.21.1, I.22.3–4. In this way, as Euben (1977, 50–56; 1990, 198–
99) argues, Thucydides is a political educator.
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of unifying speech and action into a comprehensible
whole after they have occurred. At the same time, it
may display disjunctions and disunities between the
two (Euben 1977, 37–38). It is prior to theoretical anal-
ysis insofar as it provides the material for such an anal-
ysis. But here, it is also after theoretical analysis that
Thucydides is trying to communicate in stories a notion
of excellence. Told in stories, such a contextualized pic-
ture of practical excellence communicates to leaders
the wisdom that is their concern as practical actors.
THE “MESSAGE(S)” OF THE STORY
Practical guidance requires a context in which to make
sense of action. That context is usually a complex one.
In Thucydides’ account, its properties include irony,
which is made evident in his praise of Brasidas and
which is best expressed in a narrative. The import of
this irony is to contextualize Brasidas’ virtues in such a
way that we learn to be measured and moderate in our
praise of them. We also learn, therefore, to be measured
in our expectations of the “technical expertise” that the
substitute apprenticeship of narrative or any set of ax-
ioms derived therefrom can provide.32 It is a common-
place to observe that as Thucydides unfolds his story,
he establishes a general contrast between the Spartan
and the Athenian ways. He illustrates the differences
in manner between the two chief antagonists of the
war by means of their deeds, through the words of his
characters, and sometimes in his own evaluations. The
Spartans are slow and unwilling to dare, whereas the
Athenians are quick and enterprising (VIII.96, I.70);
the Spartans are moderate (sophrosyne), the Athenians
immoderate (I.68, I.70, I.83); in foreign affairs, the Spar-
tans are accused of limited knowledge, the Athenians
credited with extended knowledge (I.68, I.71); the Spar-
tans are characterized as conservative and hesitant, the
Athenians as innovative, hasty, and tenacious (I.70,
I.71, I.102). These contrasting characteristics may be
related to the differing bases of power of the two foes:
Sparta is a continental power, exhibiting the calmer
qualities of land, and Athens is a maritime power, ex-
hibiting the restless qualities of the sea (I.83, VIII.96).
In brief, Archidamus in certain respects and Alcidas in
general both display examples of the worst characteris-
tics of the Spartans, whereas Brasidas frequently seems
more an Athenian than a Spartan.33
Against this background we observe several ironies
in the story of Brasidas. The first emerges as we begin
to notice with Edmunds that while Thucydides seems
to praise Brasidas and is himself an Athenian, he also
seems to affirm the Spartan virtues of provident de-
lay, moderation, and planning, or cautious deliberation,
while he associates the Athenian characteristics of au-
dacity, impulsiveness, and quick action with the vices
and injustices of the internecine strife of the Greek
32 Here again, a comparison with the setbacks and successes in the
career of Demosthenes may be instructive.
33 Strauss (1964) calls Brasidas the Athenian among the Spartans
(213).
cities during the war. In the stasis of Corcyra, for ex-
ample, virtues (usually associated with Sparta) become
vices, and their opposites (often Athenian character-
istics) virtues. This stasis, Edmunds argues, contains
an inversion of what was for Thucydides the natural
or normal order of political things (Edmunds 1975a,
75, 76, 81, 89–91; Thucydides, 1982, III.81.4–5, III.82).
Accordingly, Thucydides would seem to favor aristo-
cratic Spartan over democratic Athenian qualities. As
the story of Brasidas unfolds within the context of the
story of Athens and Sparta, however, we are led down
a path only to find a jester at its end.34 Spartan virtues
seem superior to the Athenian, but the most success-
ful Spartan in the first part of the war behaves like an
Athenian. Ultimately, the very nature of irony implies
that this problem of the Athenian/Spartan dichotomy
in Brasidas’ career cannot be entirely resolved. What
are we to make of this as a comment on excellence and,
especially, practical wisdom?
Let us recall that the great motion (kinesis) of which
Thucydides provides a history is itself a kind of dis-
order. The stasis of Corcyra and eventually of other
Greek cities is possible only as a result and in the con-
text of such a kinesis (III.82.1). In such a situation, the
virtues of the Spartans are insufficient. In the Archi-
damian war, at least, the characteristics of the Athe-
nians seemed largely to give them the upper hand, as,
for example, in the battle at Sphacteria. The Athenian
qualities, however, are not stable. The Athenians (“with
whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked
upon as a success sacrificed” [IV.55.2; cf. I.70.7]) want
too much after their victory at Pylos/Sphacteria and,
so, eventually lose much of what they have won there
(IV.41.4, IV.21.2). They do not know when to stop, con-
sider carefully, consolidate their gains, and perhaps rest,
as the Spartans urge them to do at the peace conference
in 425 B.C.E.35 At the same time, the portrait of Athe-
nian power and adventuring spirit, which is in large part
responsible for initiating and sustaining the events that
allow Thucydides to write the work that reveals “for all
time” its abiding truths concerning human things, shows
us that Spartan qualities alone are also insufficient. The
“Athenian” virtues of Brasidas win wars, but only if
they are tempered by “Spartan” virtues, and Spartan
34 Connor (1984) has illuminated the role of surprise and the unex-
pected in Thucydides’ History generally (16–17, 53ff.).
35 Cogan’s (1981, 73–76) argument that the Spartan presentation to
the Athenians is rhetorically inelegant is persuasive; however, it is
the Athenians, as he points out, not the Spartans, who make it so.
One element of rhetorical effectiveness is the audience, which in this
case is impossible to please. The Spartans may not have been good
speakers, but it is difficult to imagine what could have persuaded the
Athenians for peace at this point. This difficulty rests on what have by
this time clearly become Athenian vices—ambition and greed. These
vices, combined with general Athenian enthusiasm, have made the
Athenians aimless. In Cogan’s words, “They lacked a general and
agreed conception of their aims that could tell them when they had
won,” whereas Pericles’ strategy would have indicated victory at this
point (76). In the Sicilian expedition, predicated upon Alcibiades’ as-
sertion that endless activity and expansion are not vices, but necessary
for the city’s survival (Thucydides, 1919, VI.18.6–7), these Athenian
qualities end in a disaster that is not the end of the war only because
Spartan hesitation does not take advantage of it (VIII.2.1, VIII.24.5,
VIII.96.4–5). Compare Connor’s (1984) summary analysis (73ff.).
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qualities alone do not win wars either. The conservative
and self-serving behaviors of many Spartan leaders, for
example, extended the war in its final stages (Kagan
1987, 70, 330–31), and the Spartans were not above
cruel severity (IV.80). When the Spartans did eventu-
ally win the war, however, they did not deal with the
Athenians (despite the urging of their allies) as these
did with the Melians. In the latter stages of the war,
the extreme impatience of the Athenian demos, on the
one hand, and Spartan moderation combined with a
newly developed but desultory adventuresomeness, on
the other (as when, under Lycurgus, they built a large
navy to match that of the Athenians [Kagan 1987, 325–
53, 376–412]),36 gave the Spartans the ultimate victory
even while they permitted Athenian survival.
Thucydides’ realist wisdom is correspondingly bifur-
cated. In the greatest motion [kinesis] of all time, human
nature leads to political corruption (III.82–III.83), yet
some of the qualities needed to keep power for pre-
serving one’s own city are precisely the ones that bring
about the kinesis, which is in conflict with the aims of
preservation. The tendency to kinesis is brought on by
the desire for preservation (I.75.1–I.76.3, I.88.1).37 If
they are not checked, the qualities needed for preser-
vation of the city will lead to a kinesis that may well
destroy it. In the same way, then, those excellences of
Brasidas that helped his city and permitted personal
satisfaction for him may ultimately have contradicted
the interests of his city. We see this contradiction in the
conclusion to Brasidas’ story.
In the spring of 423 B.C.E., the Athenians and Spar-
tans agreed to a one-year truce. Both sides hoped to
negotiate a more general peace. During the truce and
contrary to the agreement, Brasidas continued military
activity in Thrace. His actions understandably aroused
Athenian ire (IV.122.4–5, IV.123.3) and threatened the
prospects of a more lasting peace. Thucydides does not
tell us if Brasidas was pursuing a military or political
policy in his continuation of the operations in Thrace
that were excluded by the truce. We are told only that
Brasidas was the principal Spartan opponent of peace,
because of the “success and honor”[eutychein te kai
timasthai] the war brought him. Brasidas’ opposition
to peace pairs him with Cleon, the greatest Athenian
opponent to peace, for whom the war kept his crimes
and slander from catching up with him. Apart from the
possible damage to his own city’s interests, Brasidas
was running considerable personal risk: If he failed,
he could be exiled or even capitally punished (Kagan,
1981, 309).
At the same time, it was Brasidas’ successes that
helped end the first war. The towns Brasidas captured
either by persuasion or by treachery from within gave
the Spartans something with which to bargain when
negotiating the peace (IV.81.2, IV.117, V.14.1–2). In
the view of the Spartans, however, the “good fortune”
36 On the “democratic” importance of the Athenian navy, which ran
strongly contrary to Spartan inclinations, see Garst 2000, 71–72, and
Thucydides VIII.72–VIII.79.
37 This problem is analyzed more generally by Robert Jervis (1978)
as the “security dilemma” in international affairs (167–214).
[eutyche] of Brasidas would not last forever (IV.117).
The success of Brasidas, moreover, was not entirely
equivalent to the success of Sparta: The Spartans hoped
to bargain their way out of what remained for them an
adverse situation. Not until the battle of Mantinea in
the third year of the Peace of Nicias did they regain
their self-confidence and their reputation among the
Greeks (V.75.3; Kagan 1981, 133ff.; Strauss 1964, 222).
Brasidas, on the other hand, was considerably more am-
bitious. His enterprise in northern Greece, if success-
ful, would establish a virtual empire there, for whose
existence he would be almost singly responsible while
commanding an army composed of Helots and other
Greeks but few, if any, Spartans. In his final compaign,
and the last military action before the peace, Brasidas
surrendered to the darkness of chance (I.78.1–2, V.10).
With his usual skill, swiftness, strategy, and good speak-
ing, he successfully defended Amphipolis against an
Athenian attempt to retake that vital city, but he fell in
battle. Ironically, his death cleared the way for peace,
but his ambition and successes made the negotiations
and Spartan calls for moderation possible. Success—
the achievement of one’s purpose—is not always what
or as it appears to be.
A second irony in Brasidas’ story, which foreshadows
later episodes in the war and to which I have already
alluded, concerns the question of his honesty. Brasidas
was not always truthful (IV.85.7, IV.88.1, IV.108.5,
IV.122.3, IV.122.6, IV.123.1, V.16.1).38 The untruth-
fulness of Brasidas’ speech is deeper, however, than
mere misrepresentation or seductive oratory, so that
his reputation for honesty, measured conduct, jus-
tice, and goodness results in an irony that Machiavelli
would have especially appreciated. Before Amphipolis,
Brasidas had presented himself to the Acanthians as a
liberator of Hellas, promising them autonomy, not a
new subjection to Sparta (IV.85.1, IV.86.1). The Spar-
tans intended, he said, to free Hellas, not to enslave it.
The Athenians, moreover, would not attempt to retake
the cities for their empire. If necessary, he would force
the Acanthians to be free from the Athenian yoke. His
character was such that force was not required: The
cities gladly revolted. The measured conduct and ap-
parent honesty with which Brasidas freed the Hellenic
cities from Athenian hegemony were “what mainly
created in the allies of Athens a friendly feeling for
the Lacedaemonians.” Indeed, his reputation was so
strong that the Hellenes held a “confident belief” that
the other Lacedaemonians were like him (IV.81.2–3).
This confidence would be tragically disappointed. In
the “latter part of the war” (IV.81.2), Lysander would
establish a harsh hegemony over the former Athenian
allies: Thucydides foreshadows this Spartan rule at
IV.132.3. The Spartans, contrary to Brasidas’ promises,
send Spartan military governors to Amphipolis and
Torone, and the Athenians do reply to the revolts in
38 Hunter (1973) shows that the first untruthful speech of Brasidas is
before his own men (II.87) as he tries to encourage them into battle
against the previously victorious Athennian commander, Phormio.
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force.39 As a careful reading of the latter part of Book
IV makes clear, Brasidas himself is at least partially re-
sponsible for the falsification of the claims in his speech
at Amphipolis (Conner 1984, 130–38). In Machiavellian
terms, the representative of the Spartans (Brasidas)
made the Spartans seem good by his words and deeds
when neither, especially the latter, was (cf. Machiavelli
1980, chap. XVIII). “Later on in the [Decelean] war”
(IV.81.2), the reputation Brasidas gave to the Spartans
would serve them well.
Thus, Thucydides’ seeming preference for the “Spar-
tan manner” is ambiguous. Sparta’s success rests in part
on duplicity. Blithe estimations of Athenian reaction
prove false, while the Spartans, too, will seek hege-
mony over Greece, just as the Athenians had warned
that they would even before war broke out.40 Thucy-
dides praises the “excellence and comprehension” of
Brasidas (IV.8.2) that secured these cities as bargaining
chips, a purpose that Brasidas had originally denied,
most likely because he did not know ultimate Spar-
tan intentions. The “just and measured” Brasidas at
the beginning of the campaign (IV.81.2) merely “shows
himself” measured in Thucydides’ second evaluation,
and the cities “hear” of his “gentleness” and his as-
surances, which helps incite them to revolt. Calling
Brasidas’ statements “enticing but untrue” (IV.108.5),
Thucydides can drop the attribution of justice, which
the reader has discovered is a deceptive appearance
whose seductive power will end either with Athenian
revenge on some of the “liberated” cities or with Spar-
tan tyranny.
Third, the complications, ambiguities, and ironies of
Thucydides’ account of Brasidas’ campaign in Thrace
stand in sharp contrast to the simpler account of the
distribution of capabilities that the structural theoret-
ical framework of a neorealist paradigm might supply.
As both Garst and Johnson argue in different ways, ne-
orealism, in particular, pays insufficient attention to the
human intentions, interpretations, and efforts of rhetor-
ical manipulation and counter-manipulation that make
up the substance of Thucydides’ story of this campaign
and, indeed, of the war (Garst 2000, 75–84; Johnson
1993, 208–29).41 Why do the cities of Thrace align as
they do? Perhaps, following one part of neorealist rea-
soning, they rallied to the side of Sparta to balance
the growing power of Athens after her victory at Pylos
(cf. Waltz 1979, 126; 1987, 148–61). On the other hand,
some neorealists might predict (or even prescribe) that
the Thracian states would “bandwagon” rather than
“balance,” keeping and even strengthening their ties to
Athens, given their closer geographic proximity to that
increasingly powerful city (Van Evera 1999, 176; Walt
1987, 172–80). As Garst persuasively argues, however,
39 For a close analysis of this episode and of the Hellenic “hope”
based on Brasidas’ character, see Rawlings 1981, 234–43.
40 I.76.1–2, VIII.2.4. The apparent binary structure of the History
adds weight to the ironic contrast between Brasidas and Lysander
(see Rawlings 1981, esp. 357).
41 Van Evera (1984), for example, does not neglect “human factors,”
but, in contrast to Thucydides, he does not elaborate beyond interna-
tional structural or baseline domestic constraints on the calculations
of statesmen.
the democratic character of these small Thracian cities
made them natural allies with Athens, and Thucydides
appeals to this internal characteristic as an “explana-
tion” for their alliance behaviors (Garst 2000, 84). It
is their decision to forgo this domestic link in favor
of the persuasive arguments of the tactful, measured,
and therefore smooth-tongued Brasidas, who repre-
sents the oligarchic Spartans, rather than a calculation
of the interpoleis balances of threat and power, which
is of particular note to Thucydides. In contrast to the
possibilities of balancing and bandwagoning, which can
certainly constitute a simplified baseline of reckoning
even for Thucydides (IV.108), his more complicated,
ironic account may render no greater predictive cer-
tainty than the hypotheses of neorealism. Indeed, the
quest for certainty appears to be contradicted by Thucy-
dides’ political story, but the prescriptive power of his
narrative lies precisely in the ability of his more com-
plex and even ironic narrative to give us practical wis-
dom.
The theme of “context” has appeared on multiple oc-
casions in this essay, and we have seen that it is common
for commentators on Thucydides’ History to refer in
one way or another to the ways in which he establishes
“context” in his work. Discerning the various threads
in the woof and warp of the narrative tapestry that
Thucydides weaves may well be the central problem for
interpreting his History and thereby extracting from it
the practical wisdom that he intends to bring before us
for consideration. Because the texture of the History
is so multilayered and complex, one may even ques-
tion whether practical wisdom—if such wisdom, as I
am arguing, requires some “context”—is possible at all
for Thucydides. He believes it to be possible, but it is
precisely the need to establish a context that is rarely,
if ever, predetermined that gives practical wisdom its
third ironic quality: No context can be absolutely de-
termined, and contexts are likely to be multiple.
The force of the ironies that surround the complex
context of Brasidas’ life can only be delivered in a story
(laying them out axiomatically would be like explaining
the punchline of a joke), and they are important to a
full (practical) understanding of the world Thucydides
seeks to illuminate for us. A simple, axiomatic, struc-
turalist, or hypothesis-driven description of the world,
attenuated with a few provisos and caveats, is not in and
of itself false, but insufficient.42 Thucydides implies that
the world does not appear to us in that way, and neither
can an account that purports to give us guidance in it.
Furthermore, even though this guidance, permeated by
the ironies of the situation, cannot be absolute, a simple
list of “laws” as a tool for guiding practical action will
not do: Its decontextualized character makes it insuffi-
ciently intelligible to be practically useful. Such a list is
also boring; despite an “absence of romance” in Thucy-
dides’ history (I.22.3), political pedagogy means that
the History’s readers are to be inspired by it to action
(Euben 1990, 195). In this sense, Euben is right to note
that Thucydides’ History contains an element of the
42 Compare Benjamin 1972, 144–45.
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“bardic” in its preservation of great deeds for all time.
Such a poetic immortalization or preservation renders
the deeds of the political actors in Thucydides’ History
meaningful in a way that transcends their immediate
occurrence and specific utility for those whom they
first concerned. Political (and military) action is thereby
preserved—in a story—as something worth doing, be-
cause it brings a glory that does not pass away immedi-
ately after its appearance and that displays a meaning
that is greater than the act or the words themselves,
at the same time that it may be beset by moderating
ironies. Such a display is possible only in narrative.43
Even as we may be encouraged by Thucydides’ ac-
count to be just, energetic, moderate, measured, coura-
geous, clever, and audacious (if not for reasons of
morality, then for reasons of successful action), the
ironies of his history contextualize this list of human
excellences in such a way that they remain undogmatic
and not merely utilitarian. The accounts of excellence in
Thucydides display the tragic truth, as Euben (1977) has
it, “not that truth is never useful, but that it is sometimes
futile” (199). Brasidas died in battle—a risk in any mili-
tary venture. More importantly, his political ambitions,
while they could be sustained by his abilities in the field,
could not overcome the lack of appreciation his city
Sparta had for them. Whether his failure to recognize
the lack of Spartan support constitutes a miscalculation
on his part, or simple political stupidity, or deliberate
(and perhaps foolish) disregard is unclear from Thucy-
dides’ account alone. In any case, Brasidas’ excellences
were imperfect, the success they wrought was partial,
and their ultimate outcome ambiguous and ironic. And
that is best grasped—for practical purposes—by telling
a story about it. Thucydides’ view of excellence as nec-
essary, yet assaulted by contingency and enmeshed in
complexity, can be conveyed in an intelligible manner
only by way of either a story or a list of axioms, but the
story, or “narrating,” is much more powerful, “exactly
because narration is the ‘science’ of the particular, is a
more basic category than either explanation or under-
standing” (Hauerwas 2002, 206; Milbank 1990, 264–67).
SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND EXCELLENCE:
REALIST INDETERMINISM
The story of Brasidas is an illustration of excellence,
yet also of ultimate failure, which is not, however, en-
tirely a matter of bad luck. Brasidas committed a cru-
cial political blunder by overestimating his ability to
prevail against the Spartan government in his apparent
ambition to expand the Spartan empire into northern
Greece. He either misjudged or ignored the Spartan
rulers, who seem to have been uninterested at that point
in empire. They sought only the return of their soldiers
(IV.117.2). His death, the ultimate “defeat,” may have
foreshortened a possible success, but it is incidental to
his political shortcomings. Why consider such failures?
We may make five brief observations. First, one can
learn as much about the requirements for excellence
43 On the political significance of such stories, see Arendt 1958, 175–
99.
from an example of their absence—a story of failure—
as from an example of their presence. Second, it is hard
to find an unambiguously successful man in Thucy-
dides’ History. Pericles and Nicias, perhaps the two
most obvious candidates for excellence and success,
are both eventual failures. Their failures are partially
of their own doing and partially circumstance. Pericles’
hold on the Athenian demos was never absolute (I.21.3;
II.65.1–4), and he died too soon to see his policies
through. Athens was left in the hands of increasingly
self-seeking, unscrupulous despots, while the morals
and even the instrumental rationality of the city itself
seem to have declined (IV.65.3–4, II.65.6–12; Edmunds
1975b, 73–82; cf. Plato’s [1987, 515e–516d] criticism).
One may argue, moreover, that many of the apparently
tyrannical activities and porposals of Alcibiades were a
consistent extension of the policies of Pericles (Palmer
1992), which would further complicate any assessment
of Pericles’ ultimate success or failure. In a difficult and
perhaps ironic passage, Thucydides eulogizes Nicias as
a man who gave “lifelong devotion to the practice of
law-bred virtue [arête]” (VII.86.5).44 Yet Nicias was
unable to persuade the adventuresome Athenians to
moderation, and as the result of unfavorable political
and military circumstances and his own mistakes, he
ended his life as a traitor, butchered by ignoble en-
emies (VI.86.4; Strauss 1964, 198–99), and leading a
large Athenian army with him into annihilation. The
absence of unambiguous success even in virtue that
is indicated in Thucydides’ qualified praise of Nicias
seems itself to tell us something about human possibili-
ties. Thucydides’ portrayal of the world may serve to at-
tenuate striving for power and security, if not for moral
reasons, then for practical ones. Thucydides’ story of
Brasidas is therefore one example of an effort to teach
us something practical about human excellence and its
possibilities.
Third, Thucydides’ narrative does not deliver to the
reader an explicit or exhaustive catalog of the ex-
cellences that he believes are required for success in
any circumstances. A life is itself a circumstantial set
of events, never to be repeated. At the same time,
however, to recount it in a story illuminates for us some,
even if not all, of the principles that attend our human
existence, regardless of the outcome. No matter which
figure in Thucydides’ History one were to choose, the
catalog, by reason of the nature of narrative, would
always be partial, requiring analysis of the stories that
offer us the material to consider. Such partiality ob-
tains even when a larger narrative (such as Thucydides’
History in toto) incorporates the many smaller stories
into itself. While we might thereby achieve a kind of
“impartiality” because of the multiperspectival, sum-
mary viewpoint we are given and can share with one
44 I am here following Palmer’s translation of this philologically en-
tangled passage. On its importance to an interpretation of Thucy-
dides’ understanding of virtue [arête], see especially Palmer 1989,
369–70, 380–81, 383n18, and Strauss 1964, 207–9; Thucydides’ qual-
ified praise of Nicias is an important point for reading the History
in general, even while its meaning is open to considerable dispute.
Compare Connor 1984, 205–6, Edmunds 1975a, 141ff., and Gomme,
Andrews, and Dover 1970, 461–64.
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another, it is not possible to retreat to a synoptic, Archi-
median point (cf. Arendt 1958, 11, 248, 251 vs. 175–212;
and esp. Arendt 1954, 48–52). In this way—to repeat—
narrative remains an essential complement to nomo-
thetic approaches, a primary if not exclusive source of
practical wisdom. Since I am articulating the story of
Thucydides in a partially “nonnarrative” and certainly
abbreviated form, this exercise seems circular, but it is
not viciously so, because the order of our lives is indeed
given only narratively, so that “we cannot set [theo-
retical or axiomatic] explanation and [narrative] un-
derstanding over against one another” (Milbank 1990,
266). The two are complementary. They are two aspects
of an analyzable but irreducible whole. Accordingly,
as Robert Keohane (1998) has argued, “Each analyst
of world politics has to locate herself or himself some-
where along the dimension between . . . nomothetic and
narrative epistemology” (194). (Nevertheless, the very
form of the present argument illustrates the recurrent,
ironic tensions between narrative and analytical expli-
cation or exposition.)
Fourth, one may proceed from this point to a larger
mode of comparison. How, for example, do the narra-
tive styles of other traditional realists—say Machiavelli
or Morgenthau—stack up against that of Thucydides?
Among the many comparisons of differences between
realists, Steven Forde has shown that close attention to
their narratives is one way in which we discern these
differences. We may find that the relationship between
excellence and happenstance in different realist narra-
tives points to a difference in the wisdom they pass on
to us.
Fifth, there is the matter of luck. Thucydides seems to
show in the story of Brasidas and its context excellences
that require each other for their full realization but
that also tend to exclude each other from fulfillment.
He also means to show the role of contingency in the
complex of human affairs, an understanding of which
remains for him a crucial part of wisdom.45 We may
note that the gods of the Greek pantheon are largely
absent from Thucydides’ history. This absence has led
Bernard Williams to observe that Thucydides’ picture
of the world is peculiarly modern—an observation that
is confirmed by Nietzsche’s appraisal of Thucydides—
namely, as a world in which there is nothing “beyond
some things that human beings have themselves shaped
. . . that is intrinsically shaped to human interests, in par-
ticular to human beings’ ethical interests” (Nietzsche
1968, 558–59; Williams 1993, 163).46 In such a world,
luck or contingency plays a crucial but impersonal role.
The foremost realist systematically to take into ac-
count the role of contingency, which he referred to as
“Fortuna,” is generally considered to be not Thucy-
dides, but Machiavelli. In Machiavelli’s Italy, “person-
alized” notions of contingency (known as Fortuna) and
45 Indeed, Cornford (1907) claims that tyche is a central figure in
Thucydides’ “drama.”
46 Thucydides’ “modern” qualities may also be accentuated by his
methodological relationship to the Greek students of medicine
and to naturalistic philosophers like Anaxagoras and Democritus
(cf. Voegelin 1957, 351–58).
the human excellence required to overcome it were
widespread and influential (Flanagan 1972, 130–35).
Derived adjectivally from the Latin fors, which ulti-
mately derives from the root of ferre (to bring), fors
is that which is brought; Fortuna is the goddess who
brings it. Tyche, similarly, derives from a Greek root
meaning “to succeed,” or “to attain.” Thus, as Thomas
Flanagan (1972) concludes,
The basic meaning in both cases is not what we moderns
term ‘chance,’ that is, events which seem to occur randomly.
Rather the connotation is that of success, which is brought
about by an unseen person or power who works in ways
inscrutable to us. Thus there is never a clear distinction
between fortune and fate. Both conceptions refer to the
order of the gods which can never be fully understood by
men. If there is a difference, it is one of emphasis. Fate
represents the divine will as something fixed and inflexible,
while fortune represents it as elastic, unpredictable, and
open to influence by human supplication. (130)
Fortune was for Machiavelli, however, an entirely
immanent phenomenon, which he personalized for pur-
poses of prescription. The vagaries and vicissitudes of
fortune in the realist world have no transcendent, di-
vine source, nor do we have recourse against them in
such a transcendent realm. Fortune is what times and
circumstances bring us, to which we must respond with
the immanent tools we have at hand (Flanagan 1972,
142–56; Newell 1987, 628–29). Moreover, Machiavelli
did not believe that men can entirely overcome Fortune
with virtu, but that they can at times control “her.” As
Flanagan has it, “Machiavelli in effect promises only
that we can increase our chances against Fortune, not
that we can eliminate her effects entirely.” Fortune is
variable, changing with time and place.47 The man of
virtu must accommodate himself to her caprice if he
hopes to achieve his ends.48
Thucydides, similarly, did not treat tyche as either
a force or a goddess that we can control. The unex-
plained, unforeseen events of tyche are not to be manip-
ulated by us, nor are they the product of malevolent or
benevolent forces. Like the later Machiavelli, however,
Thucydides believed that tyche can be countered with
preparation and experience. The Athenians, for exam-
ple, take advantage of tyche at Sphacteria, and Brasidas’
generalship along with the discipline of his troops over-
comes adverse tyche in his campaign in Thrace. Earlier,
in a somewhat disingenuous speech before his troops
47 One might usefully compare this notion of Fortuna with Carl von
Clausewitz’s (1968) depictions of “friction,” chance, and incalcula-
bility in war (117, 140–42, 157, 162–67).
48 In the famous twenty-fifth chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli sug-
gests that Fortune controls our doings about half the time, and in the
other half we can control her with the proper qualities of virtu. Space
limitations deny a rehearsal of Machiavelli’s teaching on Fortuna, nor
is it to the point here, but his statement that “I think it may be true
that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the
other half or thereabouts to be governed by us” (1980, chap. XXV)
[“Nondimanco, perché il nostro libero arbitrio non sia spento, iudico
potere essere vero che la fortuna sia arbitra della metà della azioni
nostre, ma che etiam lei ne lasci governare l’altra metà, o presso’, a
noi” (Machiavelli 1995, 162–63)] does not imply, it seems to me (pace
Strauss 1953, 178), that proper virtu will also permit us entirely to rule
that half of our actions of which fortune is the ruler.
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prior to the naval engagement at Rhium, Brasidas en-
courages his men with the questionable (and ultimately
false) observation that previous defeats were the prod-
uct of adverse tyche, now to be overcome by their own
preparations. These words prove false largely because
the Spartan preparation against the unforeseen is not
as thorough as that of the Athenians (II.85.2, II.87–
90).49 Tyche is the material happenstance to which the
man of excellence is prepared to respond. Tyche is
for Thucydides, too, a material and immanent, not a
transcendent or divine element of incalculability in the
affairs of men. Such incalculability can have various
immanent sources, and it is not always possible to over-
come it (Bury 1909, 128–30; Edmunds 1975a, esp. 7–
88, 174–204; Woodhead 1970, 168–69), as the stories
of Brasidas show. Most narrowly, the virtue that may
overcome tyche is gnome, which consists principally of
the twin aspects of reason and resolve (Edmunds 1975a,
esp. 7–88; Rawlings 1981, 130–35). The other virtues
that Brasidas exhibits supplement these and assure the
success that begins with reason (or intelligence) and
resolve.
Tyche is the term Thucydides finds at hand to symbol-
ize systematic unpredictability in the world. Since tyche
is not systematic in its appearances, however, we cannot
overcome it by mere calculation. The stories we tell are
a way of rendering the incalculability of fortune or tyche
intelligible and, thereby, of gaining wisdom concerning
its place in human affairs. By means of stories we may
prepare ourselves to be excellent and thereby coun-
teract bad luck or take advantage of good luck within
the complex reality that is our existence. The story of
Brasidas, which includes his political failures and his
untimely demise, is one such tale.
CONCLUSIONS
Daniel Garst has persuasively argued that Thucydides’
History presents a picture of political power that not
only is richer and more nuanced than the neorealist
conception, but also points to a serious theoretical de-
fect in it. Thucydides’ use of political speeches captures
a distinction between the possession and the exercise
of political power that neorealism misses. This confu-
sion also leads neorealism to understand less nimbly
than Thucydides did the workings of hegemony in in-
ternational affairs (Garst 1989, 20–22, 22–24). On the
literary front, we have noted that Steven Forde finds
in Thucydides a presentation of the nature of power
that perceives ironies and tragedies not evident in the
writings of realists like Machiavelli (or of contemporary
neorealists). I have added to these arguments concern-
ing the richer depths of Thucydides’ realism an argu-
ment that the narrative itself works as a pedagogical
device to which modern realists and neorealists aspire,
49 Hunter’s (1973) analysis of this incident gives several reasons why,
in Thucydides’ likely estimation, Brasidas’ speech is flawed (140–41,
150–51, 157–58); cf. Allison 1989, esp. 28–65. Since the intention of
this speech was to motivate troops to victory, “tactical” (but unsuc-
cessful), rather than “flawed,” may be the correct adjective for its
apparent lack of veracity.
but that they cannot emulate with nomothesis or even
anecdotes alone.
The Thucydidean realist world is a world of action
and contingency, of human purposes and the vagaries
of happenstance. Human beings are motivated to ac-
tion primarily (but not necessarily exclusively) by fear,
honor, and interest, which are linked either to acquiring
or to maintaining political and material power. One
overcomes contingency and luck not with obedient
piety, but with preparation and skill, which are shaped
by the qualities of one’s own character that one brings
to bear in a particular situation. Moderation or even
hesitation may, as with the Spartans, help us to see the
limitations of our pursuit of power, but other qualities
actually enable the pursuit. These other qualities are
displayed in stories of how men pursue and keep power.
Realist and neorealist reservations concerning
morality notwithstanding, Thucydides’ story of the war
may also have a moral purpose of sorts. Perhaps it in-
tends to moderate our adventurism, because it shows us
the ironies and ambiguities of pursuing power. Thucy-
dides’ wisdom moderates us in a Spartan direction, be-
cause we come to see that an unbridled response to fear
and an unbridled pursuit of honor and interest defined
in terms of power are ultimately self-contradictory or
self-destructive, as was Brasidas’ strong-willed policy
in Thrace and Athenian policy after the death of Per-
icles. This self-contradiction may not always be appar-
ent, as it was not to the avaricious Athenians, or to
the Hellenic cities of the Athenian Empire, who, won
over by the smooth words and seeming goodness of one
general, exchanged a measured tyranny for a harsher
one (which, ironically, was Spartan, despite that city’s
many measured characteristics). Thucydides does not
explicitly espouse a moral theory, and a reading of his
History might make one wonder if that were possible,
yet he leads us to see through his narrative that the pure
pursuit of material advantage may require a conven-
tional moderation to keep it from self-contradiction.50
Perhaps this is one of the “secret instructions” of which
Hobbes speaks.51
Thucydides’ concern with human limitations along
these registers is not a sentiment merely of frustration,
but of a kind of tragedy that serves as an admonition.
For Thucydides, pursuit of one’s own ends and the ends
of one’s city, for example, may result in a tragic conflict,
50 See also Palmer 1989, 373, 381, and Forde 2000. In the larger struc-
ture of the History, we might also compare the statements of the
Athenian ambassadors at Sparta before the war with the growing
extremism of Athenian policies as the war continues. In the pre-
war debate, the Athenians admit to “realist” motivations of “fear,
honor, and interest” for retaining their empire (I.76, I.77), but they
also claim “measured conduct” in the treatment of their imperial
subjects (I.77). That measured “tyranny,” which parallels the initially
measured tyranny of Hippias and his predecessors at Athens (VI.54),
stands in contrast to Athenian language and conduct at Melos, in
Thrace, and in later episodes (cf. VI.61).
51 Similarly, the Periclean appeals to glory (II.42–II.45) imply that
longevity, stability, or even moderation is not necessarily politically
ultimate. Attaining glory may render individual or collective survival
itself secondary: Better a short, bright light than a dimmer and longer,
but less worthy one. Since Hobbes ([1651] 1968) preferred survival,
he endeavored to discount glory (130, 150–60).
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as they did for Brasidas. Similarly, the virtues that pre-
serve a city in war must be tempered by those that keep
peace, yet these virtues may conflict. To survive, one not
only must shore up and expand what one has, as some
realists might suggest: One also must rest as the Spar-
tans suggested to the Athenians.52 This, too, is part of
“realist” wisdom. The need for moderation in the face
of tragedy means that Thucydides cannot tell stories,
except of certain military incidents, that are as simple as,
say, Machiavelli’s terse examples of virtu in the Prince.
Thucydides does not reduce every human activity to
a kind of military—which is to say, technical—activity
(Wood 1967, 170–71). Instead, the intentions of oth-
ers, the ambiguities of objectives, and the tragedies of
complex human interactions are a part of that which
is permanent in the nature of things, exposed by the
greatest kinesis of all time. Thucydides need not tell
us so directly: His History can mean nothing less. This
aspect of the History reminds us of Hayden White’s
(1987) observation, taken from Hegel, of the seeming
fact that “every historical narrative has as its latent or
manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of
which it treats” (14). Thucydides seems strictly to avoid
moralizing, and yet, to understand his real[ist] world
of human action and contingency, we must understand
not only calculations of interest or fear or honor de-
fined in terms of power, but also the other elements
of human life. These include the conflicting intentions
of our desires (justice and revenge, security and glory),
the conflicting ends within a single city or even person
and, most especially, the possibility of happenstance.
Without being aware of these dimensions of human
reality, we cannot be wise in Thucydides’ sense.
While the focus of this essay has been on the decision-
making of individual leaders, similar considerations
are valid for decision-making “collectives,” such as the
Athenian assembly. As we have seen, Thucydides iden-
tifies specific “character” traits of the two central cities
of his historical narrative, Sparta and Athens, a number
of which he then transfers to a variety of individual ac-
tors in that narrative, including Brasidas. The Athenian
demos, moreover, is a decision-maker in its own right:
its hastiness and impatience, subsequent regret, and
false hopes, for example, lead to decisions of consid-
erable import throughout the History (III.49, VI.93).
Thucydides’ lessons concerning moderation and mea-
sured conduct can apply alike to individuals and to
groups that are articulated to action. While we should
beware a one-to-one transference and while leadership
within group processes is an important aspect of such
processes (that it was for Thucydides is revealed, for
example, in many of the speeches he records), groups,
52 To give an example of such disputes among realists, one might point
to Machiavelli’s (1996) negative evaluation of Spartan moderation
(21–23 [Discourses, I.6]; Mindle 1985, 219). His indictment seems
nearly “Athenian,” at least if Alcibiades’ arguments for imperialism
can be thought to be the attitude of the majority of the Athenians
after the death of Pericles (Thucydides 1919, VI.18.4–7; cf. Forde
1992, 384–87, 389); as noted above, Palmer (1992, esp. 41–42, 97, 119–
120) shows that the arguments of Alcibiades in favor of Athenian
imperialism are consistent with the prior arguments and policies of
Pericles.
like individuals, can be characterized by the qualities
of their collective decision-making processes and out-
comes (cf. Ober 1989, 68–95).53
The story of Brasidas reminds those who argue for
the realist or neorealist schools in the study of political
philosophy or of international relations of three princi-
ples. First, axiomatic knowledge of material or systemic
factors in international relations may be a good “first
cut” (even though it is logically subsequent to narra-
tive), but it is insufficient for practical purposes, since
we must also take into account the roles of contingency,
luck, and chance in a narratively contextualized way.
Nomothesis, therefore, remains perhaps a good first
glance but an insufficient lasting endowment for politi-
cal practice. We require not only theoretical exposition,
but narrative. That is, we require stories that integrate,
contextualize, illustrate, and illuminate in those specific
ways that theoretical analysis cannot.
Second, luck and contingency are central to the suc-
cess of human enterprises and they require human
excellence—revealed in narrative—to deal with them,
even under the conditions that realism holds to be true.
The first point of wisdom in realism is that happen-
stance is a real phenomenon of the world, requiring ex-
cellence to overcome, and that this combination of luck
and human response is an integral part of the world,
which the practitioner (or student) of politics denies at
his or her peril. Success, fame, or glory in international
affairs requires not only the knowledge of the scholar
or keen observer, but also the excellence of character to
use that knowledge to one’s own purposes and, perhaps,
the good fortune to be placed into the circumstances of
power in which one can, in fact, employ such knowledge
and character.
Finally, as Daniel Garst (1989) also shows in a dif-
ferently contextualized argument, the story of Brasidas
points to the prudential requirements of political power
(21–24). The incalculability in the complexity of human
affairs that the story of Brasidas illustrates prevents
politics from becoming simply a technique of mastery
and demands that it be a practical science requiring
prudence, wisdom, and, most likely, luck. The nature
and qualities of this incalculability can be partially ar-
ticulated in axiomatic generalizations, but, without ex-
cluding lists of axioms, they are more ably and usefully
demonstrated in that most potent substitute for direct
experience—stories.
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